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Abstract
Behavioural interventions, such as informational nudges, have become an
increasingly popular strategy in demand-side energy management. In par-
ticular, home energy reports (HERs) have been used to induce behavioural
change among residential consumers. These HERs typically provide peer
comparisons of energy use and information about energy savings opportu-
nities. Despite the growing prevalence of HERs and a shift from postal to
electronic delivery of HERs, the experimental evidence base of their effec-
tiveness comes primarily from HERs delivered by post from a single vendor
(Opower). Whether that evidence generalises to other programmes and to
the electronic delivery of HERs is unclear. This paper reports new evidence
for HER effectiveness from a 12-month field experiment with approximately
9,000 households that tested electronic HER programme in a deregulated
American residential electricity market. Despite high non-compliance with
HER delivery, the programme reduced household electricity consumption by
2.9%, 95% CI [-5.0%, -0.76%]. This estimated reduction is consistent with
prior estimated impacts of HERs delivered by post and implies electronic
HERs are at least as effective as reports delivered by post in reducing elec-
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tricity consumption, while they are administered at a lower cost.
Keywords: Behaviour Change, Impact Evaluation, Energy Conservation,
Nudge
Highlights
• Electronic home energy reports reduce electricity consumption by 2.9%
• Electronic home energy reports appear at least as effective as physical
reports




Widespread concerns about energy reliability and anthropogenic climate
change have led to growing pressures on the energy sector to manage energy
demands (Dietz et al., 2009). To encourage demand-side energy reductions,
both private and public sector actors have increasingly relied on behavioural
programmes (Karlin et al., 2015). Behavioural programmes apply social sci-
ence theories of human behaviour and decision making to encourage be-
haviour change without eliminating choice or changing economic incentives
(Sussman and Chikumbo, 2016). The impacts of such programmes, often
called “nudges”, have been quantified through field experiments in a variety
of economic sectors (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
In the energy sector, the most extensive experimental evidence for the
effectiveness of behavioural programmes comes from the home energy report
(HER) programmes run by the company Opower (now part of Oracle). In
collaboration with dozens of energy utilities across the United States, Opower
ran a series of field experiments to evaluate the effect of HERs on residential
energy consumption. Based on research suggesting social comparisons influ-
ence energy consumption, HERs use social comparisons and personalised in-
formation provision to promote behaviour change (Nolan et al., 2008; Schultz
et al., 2007). The reports give individuals information on how their electricity
use compares with households of similar size in their area. This information
is combined with text implying lower energy consumption is socially “good”
and with personalised strategies for lowering energy consumption, which are
based on the household’s energy use profile. Allcott (2011) first estimated
the average treatment effect of HERs using data from approximately 600,000
urban and rural households that were randomised as part of the Opower
programmes.
The Opower programmes reduced energy consumption by an estimated
1.4% to 3.3%, depending on the regional market (Allcott, 2011). These effects
are reported to persist in the long run due to improved capital stock of more
efficient technologies and changes in behavioural habits (Allcott and Rogers,
2014; Brandon et al., 2017; Ayres et al., 2009). Based on these results,
HERs are cost-effective compared to energy efficiency programmes (Allcott
and Mullainathan, 2010). Similarly, personalised, pro-social messaging has
Abbreviations: HER, home energy report; REP, retail electricity provider; ITT, intent-
to-treat
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been shown to be cost-effective in encouraging reductions in residential water
consumption, indicating analogous behavioural programmes can be applied
successfully in other sectors (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Bernedo et al., 2014).
Since the evaluation of Opower’s programmes, utilities and other third-
party companies have developed and implemented their own variations of
home energy reports. However, to our knowledge, only one of these variations
has been formally evaluated with experimental designs in the peer-reviewed
literature. Byrne et al. (2018) studies an Australian programme that uses
high-frequency smart meter data to provide social norms and personalised
information to households via biweekly emails and a smart meter web portal.
However, the HERs are accompanied by feedback from the granular, smart
meter data and an interactive web portal, making it difficult to disentangle
the effect of the HERs from the other components of the intervention.
This gap in the evidence base is important given that the evaluated
Opower programmes have been shown to have partner selection bias; the
utilities that use Opower differ systematically from other utilities (Allcott
and Mullainathan, 2012). This bias potentially restricts the generalisabil-
ity of the Opower results. In other words, the estimated average treatment
effects reported in the literature may not reflect expected impacts in other
HER programmes. Furthermore, the Opower experiments involved physical
reports, delivered by post. Yet many HER programmes, including Opower’s,
have shifted to electronic communication, which tends to have lower read
rates than direct mail (DMN, 2012).
Using new data from a randomised control trial conducted over a period
of 12 months with nearly 9,000 households, this paper adds to the literature
on HERs by estimating the causal effect of an electronic HER programme
on residential electricity consumption. Despite high non-compliance with
HER delivery, the HER programme is estimated to have reduced monthly
electricity consumption by 2.9%, 95% CI [-5.00%, -0.76%], which is consistent
with published estimates from the Opower programmes with physical reports.
This result suggests electronically delivered HERs are at least as effective in
reducing electricity consumption as HERs delivered by post and achieve their
impacts at lower cost. The paper also speaks to the broader literature on
using social comparisons and informational nudges to influence behaviour in
an environmental policy context (Croson and Treich, 2014).
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2. Methods and Data
2.1. Experimental Design
In late 2015, a private home sensing and software company began working
with a retail electricity provider (REP) to quantify the impact of electroni-
cally provided HERs on residential electricity consumption in one American
state1. At the time of the study, the REP had customers from seven utilities
in the state.
The software company implemented a randomised control trial using a
sample that comprised all households registered with the REP in the state
in November 2015 (N = 9,383). Households were blocked by utility provider,
and then 14.5% of the customers within each block were randomly assigned
to a control group that would receive status quo communication from the
REP. The remaining households from each utility were assigned to the treat-
ment group and received the additional customised HERs developed by the
software company. One utility had only 3 customers, all of which were as-
signed to treatment. This utility is excluded from analysis due to the lack of
control group (Figure 1).
The reports included information on the customers’ monthly electricity
use in kilowatt hours (kWh), a social comparison module comparing the
users’ electricity consumption with that of similar households in their area,
and customised advice on reducing electricity use. The utilities provided the
use data in the reports, and the software company’s proprietary algorithms
generated the customised advice (Cetin et al., 2016). The completed reports
were sent to the REP, and the REP distributed them to households via
email. The email contained both an attached PDF of the HER and a link
to a private web portal, where customers could view their current and past
reports. An example HER is shown in Appendix A.
1We obtained the data from the home sensing and software company. In order to
receive permission to make the de-identified data publicly accessible, we agreed to not
name the company or the state in which the experiment was run. However, we note the
field experiment was run in a U.S. state in which the electricity market has been deregu-
lated and utility revenues decoupled from electricity volume throughput, removing utility
disincentive to pursuing consumer energy efficiency (Nissen and Williams, 2016). Addi-
tionally, the states’ energy efficiency resources standards add a positive financial incentive
for utilities to pursue demand-side energy efficiency programmes (ACEEE, 2017). These
incentives may encourage retail electricity providers in the state to pursue behavioural
energy efficiency programmes such as home energy reports.
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Figure 1: Flow diagram of the progress through the randomised control trial.
2.2. Data and Baseline Characteristics
Household electricity use and HER delivery are available at monthly in-
tervals over the course of the study period. Monthly baseline electricity use
data is available for each month since the household joined the REP, which
varies between households. In December 2015, prior to the HER intervention,
the average logged monthly electricity use in treatment and control groups
is statistically equivalent, both within utility and overall (Table 1).
The de-identified data and code are available through the Open Science
Framework at https://osf.io/a2fhq/.
2.3. Attrition
Randomisation of the HER treatment took place in November 2015. The
first HERs were sent in January 2016, reporting electricity use from the pre-
vious month. Our post-intervention study period is twelve months (January
2016 through December 2016), which is substantially longer than most exper-
imental studies on information-based energy conservation experiments. In a
meta-analysis of 156 published experiments from 1975 to 2012, Delmas et al.
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Table 1: Average monthly electricity use in December 2015, the month before the first
HERs were sent to treatment households. Electricity use is compared between treatment
assignment using a t-test of average log electricity use in December 2015 and p-values are
shown in parentheses.
Treatment Control Difference
Utility n Use (kWh) n Use (kWh) (p-value)
1 3,931 969.00 654 967.26 1.74 (0.48)
2 2,131 876.29 355 1001.95 -125.66 (0.35)
3 1,251 738.29 209 747.17 -8.88 (0.33)
4 317 882.15 50 894.04 -11.89 (0.74)
5 31 791.76 6 534.75 257.01 (0.40)
6 6 367.00 1 NA NA
All 7,667 901.40 1,275 933.11 -31.71 (0.75)
(2013) reported that about 60 percent of the studies lasted for three months
or less, and they called for studies of longer duration.
One issue that arises in longer studies is attrition. In the month after
randomisation, 4.7% of households left the REP, and the utilities transferred
no use data on these customers. As expected, given the HERs had not
yet been sent, the proportion of households without data is similar between
treatment (4.4%) and control (6.4%) groups, and thus their exclusion from
the analysis causes no potential problems for estimation.
Attrition of customers continued throughout the treatment period at
about 450 households per month, and the monthly rate is similar between the
treatment and control groups (Figure 2). Over the entire twelve month pe-
riod after the intervention began, households assigned to treatment have an
attrition rate of 55.5% compared to 54.0% in the control group, a difference
of 1.5%, 95%CI [-1.39%, 4.52%]. Furthermore, the average pre-intervention
electricity use of households who attrite is similar between treatment and con-
trol groups: the difference between them is 0.025 log(kWh/month), 95%CI
[-0.0002, 0.048].
If the rate of attrition is independent of potential electricity use with and
without HERs, attrition does not create bias in the estimation of the treat-
ment effect. Although no direct test can confirm or reject this independence
assumption, the evidence from Figure 2, the comparison of pre-treatment
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use, and the overall difference in rates is consistent with the assumption.
Figure 2: Percent of each experimental group for which electricity use is observed over the
study period. Exact values are provided in Appendix B.
.
2.4. Intent-to-treat Effect
We focus on estimating the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of the electron-
ically delivered HER reports. The ITT is the effect of being assigned to
receive an HER, regardless of whether the HER was delivered or read by
the household. Randomisation of the HER delivery ensures the ITT can
be estimated without bias, even when there is experimental non-compliance,
i.e. when households did not receive some monthly reports2. Furthermore,
the ITT estimate is the estimand of interest for the REP and policy makers
2Simply excluding the non-complying households from the treatment group would cre-
ate bias in our estimator if the factors that affect whether a household is sent a report are
also correlated with household electricity use
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who are interested in the expected impact of a real-world, electronic HER
programme, not an idealised programme that has zero non-compliance.
The programme aimed to send reports to households on a monthly basis
for a period of 12 months. However, because of periodic delays in utilities
reading electricity meters and transferring the use data between the utili-
ties, REP, and the company creating the HERs, most households did not
receive an HER every month. A relatively large percentage (36 percent) of
households assigned to treatment did not receive any HERs; in their case,
the timing of meter readings and data transfer never matched the timing
requirements for creating a monthly HER for them. Although the ITT can
be estimated without bias from non-compliance, we note the average logged
electricity use of those who were assigned to treatment but did not receive
any reports is statistically equivalent to the average logged electricity use
for those who received at least one report. This suggests that those who
did not receive reports did not have systematically higher or lower electricity
consumption relative to the rest of the treatment group. The frequency of
reports sent to treatment group households is reported in Table 2.












The primary model specification relates log electricity use with treatment
assignment and is of the form:
ln(Yit) = β0 + β1 · trtit + Ui + µym + αi + εit (1)
where Yit is the monthly electricity use of household i in month t in units of
kWh per month; trtit is the binary treatment assignment of each household
during each month; Ui is a series of indicators for the utility of household i;
µym is a series of month-by-year dummy indicators; αi represents a household
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error term; and εit is random error. Logs were used to adjust for the right-
skew in the electricity use values and so model outputs can be interpreted as
a percentage change between control and treatment. This empirical strategy
is a standard model for identifying intent to treat effects when households
are randomly assigned to treatment (Gerber and Green, 2012).
The primary parameter of interest in this specification is β1, which indi-
cates the ITT: the effect of assignment to the treatment group on electricity
consumption. The model parameters are estimated with generalised least
squares using a random effects panel data model. Standard errors are clus-
tered by household to account for serial autocorrelation.
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Estimated ITT
Running a random effects panel regression of the form in Equation 1,
the intent-to-treat effect, β1, is estimated as -2.88% (SE = 1.083%) with a
95% confidence interval of -5.0% to -0.76%. If we remove households with
monthly electricity use values in the top one percent of all observed use
(>3,201 kWh/month), the ITT is -2.60%, 95% CI [-4.79, -0.42], indicating
the effect is robust to removing these “outliers”.
Given that some households were not compliant with their treatment as-
signment (they received no HER), we cannot estimate the average treatment
effect of being sent an HER unless we were willing to assume that non-
compliance was independent of potential energy use, an assumption that is
unlikely to be true. Nevertheless, we can estimate the causal effect of being
sent at least one HER for the subgroup of households that comply with their
treatment assignment. This complier subgroup is comprised of households
who get at least one HER when they are assigned to treatment and do not
get an HER when they are not assigned to treatment. To estimate this causal
effect, we use a two-stage panel data regression estimator with randomized
assignment as an instrumental variable for receiving at least one HER. We
estimate that this complier average causal effect of receiving at least one
HER is -4.84%, 95% CI [-8.40, -1.28], an effect that is more than 1.5 times
the estimated ITT effect.
The estimated intent-to-treat effect of -2.88% is consistent with the upper
end of the average treatment effect estimates from Allcott’s (2011) assess-
ment of Opower’s HER programmes on energy use across the United States.
Assuming that HERs do not cause an increase in electricity consumption
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in any household, the intent-to-treat effect represents a lower bound on the
average treatment effect of this programme. This suggests that if compliance
was increased, the causal effect of the programme on electricity consumption
would be larger.
3.2. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Understanding how the treatment effect varies conditional on observ-
able characteristics of the households can help better target the interven-
tion to subgroups who would be most responsive (i.e., improve programme
cost-effectiveness) and can shed light on the underlying mechanisms through
which the intervention affects behaviour (Ferraro and Miranda, 2013). The
moderating variable that is most frequently examined in prior studies is pre-
treatment energy use. REPs are usually able to observe this variable, and
thus could condition on it when targeting an HER intervention. Allcott
(2011) reported that higher energy users before the HER programme con-
served more energy after receiving HERs. Similar results have been reported
in the context of water use (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Ferraro and Miranda,
2013).
To test for heterogeneous treatment effects conditional on pre-treatment
electricity use in our study, we define high users as individuals whose energy
use was above the median in the month prior to when the first HERs were
sent. We use only one month of pre-treatment use because the extent of
pre-treatment data available varies between households. We add this indi-
cator variable to the regression model in Equation (1) both on its own and
interacted with the treatment variable as:
ln(Yit) = β0 + β1 · trtit + β2 · trtit ·Hi +Hi + Ui + µym + αi + εit (2)
where Hi is the indicator for users with above median energy consumption
the month before treatment.
In this specification, β1 (the estimated coefficient on the treatment vari-
able) is the estimated ITT for the low users, and β1 + β2 (the combined
coefficients of the treatment variable and the treatment variable interacted
with the indicator variable for high user) is the ITT for the high users. This
subgroup definition was used by Ferraro and Price (2013) and is coarser but
similar to the definition by decile used by Allcott (2011). The estimated coef-
ficient on the treatment variable is -3.01% (CI 95%[-5.41%, -0.62%]), which is
essentially unchanged from the original ITT estimate. The interaction term’s
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coefficient (β2) is small and not statistically different from zero: 0.59% (CI
95%[-1.59%, 2.78%]). Thus, in contrast to previous studies, we do not detect
any difference in the behavioural responses of low and high energy users.
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Programme administrators have a number of levers at their disposal to
influence residential energy use, including traditional financial incentives. In-
creasingly, however, they are turning to behavioural mechanisms. Based on
theories from the behavioural sciences, behavioural interventions are often
relatively simple to implement and have been shown to be cost-effective (All-
cott and Rogers, 2014). In the energy sector, home energy reports use social
comparisons and personalised information to encourage residential energy use
reductions. Prior published evidence on the impacts of these reports come
from reports delivered by post from a single vendor (Opower). However,
today there are many other utilities and third parties who have developed
their own versions of home energy reports, and many of these reports are
delivered electronically.
Using data from a randomised field experiment aimed at reducing residen-
tial electricity use, this analysis estimates the effect of home energy reports
developed by a private home sensing and software company and delivered
electronically. The results indicate the programme caused a 2.9% reduc-
tion in residential electricity consumption. Despite non-compliance in report
delivery, the estimated impact lies on the upper end of previous estimated
impacts. Whether these results are generalisable to contexts outside of this
study’s geographic context is an open empirical question. The customer base,
management styles, and regulatory contexts of electricity providers that elect
to participate in home energy report programmes may differ from utilities
that do not participate, reducing the external validity of the estimated im-
pacts (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2012). Nevertheless, given that the esti-
mated impacts are consistent with prior estimated impacts of HERs delivered
by post, they imply that, at least in some contexts, electronically delivered
HERs are as effective as physical reports in reducing electricity consumption
and are more cost effective.
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Appendix A. Example Home Energy Report
Figure A.3: An example of the layout of the home energy reports used in this study.
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Appendix B. Attrition
Table B.3 below shows the cumulative attrition by experimental group for
each month of the study period, as plotted in Figure 2.
Table B.3: Cumulative attrition, by experimental group.










October 2015 167 97.8% 6 99.5%
November 2015 554 92.8% 135 89.4%
December 2015 1009 86.8% 150 88.2%
January 2016 1209 84.2% 171 86.6%
February 2016 1531 80.0% 233 81.7%
March 2016 2424 68.4% 397 68.9%
April 2016 2659 65.3% 446 65.0%
May 2016 2825 63.1% 470 63.1%
June 2016 2994 60.9% 509 60.1%
July 2016 3167 58.7% 526 58.7%
August 2016 3316 56.7% 545 57.3%
September 2016 3455 54.9% 573 55.1%
October 2016 3643 52.5% 590 53.7%
November 2016 3930 48.7% 628 50.7%
December 2016 4257 44.5% 689 46.0%
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